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Abstract—In today’s growing data market, wireless service providers (WSPs) compete severely to attract users by announcing
innovative data plans. Two of the most popular innovative data plans are rollover and shared data plans, where the former plan allows a
user to keep his unused data quota to next month and the latter plan allows users in a family to share unused data. As a pioneer to
provide such data plans, a WSP faces immediate revenue loss from existing users who pay less overage charges due to less data
over-usage, but his market share increases gradually by attracting new users and those under the other WSPs. In some countries,
WSPs have asymmetric timing for providing such innovative data plans, while some other markets’ WSPs have symmetric timing or no
planning. This raises the question of why and when the competitive WSPs should offer the new data plans. This paper provides game
theoretic modelling and analysis of the WSPs’ timing of offering innovative data plans, by considering new user arrival and dynamic
user churn between WSPs. Our equilibrium analysis shows that the WSP with small market share prefers to announce the innovative
data plan first to attract more users, while the WSP with large market share prefers to announce later to avoid the immediate revenue
loss. In a market with many new users, WSPs with similar market shares will offer the data plans simultaneously, but these WSPs
facing few new users may not offer any new plan. Perhaps surprisingly, WSPs’ profits can decrease with new user number and they
may not benefit from the option of innovative data plans. Finally, unlike rollover data plan, we show that the timing of shared data plan
further depends on the composition of users.
Index Terms—Networks economics, data plan upgrade timing, user dynamics, Nash equilibrium
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
THE development of mobile technology has been drivingthe rapid growth of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones
and iPad) and the users’ data consumption. To attract more
users and increase market shares, competitive wireless ser-
vice providers (WSPs) have announced new alluring data
plans to save users’ costs. Rollover data plan is one of
the most popular innovative data plans, which allows the
users to keep the current month’s unused data quota to next
month without any additional charge. Take the USA market
as an example. AT&T has freely upgraded its users’ data
plans to include rollover, where a user’s left data from last
month can be used after the current month’s data quota is
used up. Another popular innovative plan is shared data
plan, which allows two or more users (devices) to share a
common pool of data quota in each month. For example,
China Mobile allows two users in the same city to combine
their data plans without additional charge. Both rollover
and shared data plans are attractive to (heavy) users by
reducing their expected data costs in different ways: the
former seeks inner-user data sharing by pooling an individ-
ual’s monthly data quota over time, while the latter seeks
inter-user data sharing by pooling two or more users’ data
quota in each month.
To a WSP’s point of view, both rollover and shared
data plans reduce its overage charges from heavy users,
but can increase its market share by attracting new users
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and those from its WSP competitors. In reality, we observe
that the WSPs’ timing of announcing the innovative data
plans is very different in different countries. For example,
in the saturated data market of the USA, T-Mobile with
small market share is a pioneer to announce its rollover data
plan in 2014. Though its immediate revenue from existing
users reduced, it successfully increased its market share by
more than 1 million users in merely a quarter [1]. The major
WSPs, AT&T and Verizon in the same market unveiled their
rollover data plans sequentially in 2015 and 2016, respec-
tively. Different from the USAmarket, China’s market is fast
growing with many new users annually, and we observe
that China Mobile and China Unicom offered the rollover
data plan at the same time [2]. However, in some saturated
markets such as Singapore, the major WSPs SingTel and
Starhub have similar market shares and neither provides the
rollover data plan. Similar situations happened to the shared
data plan case. For example, in some countries (e.g., the UK),
the WSPs with diverse market shares sequentially provided
the shared data plans [3], while in some countries (e.g.,
China), WSPs offered the shared data plans almost at the
same time [4], [5]. This motivates us to ask the key question
in this paper: Why and when should the competitive WSPs
announce the innovative data plans?
There are some recent works discussing shared and
rollover data plans from a user’s or a single WSP’s perspec-
tive ( [6], [7], [8], [9]). [6] models and numerically analyzes
a user’s choice between individual and shared data plan.
In [7], the authors study a monopoly WSP’s decision on
the adoption of shared data plan, by examining the cost
for such a new service. [8] analyzes the benefits of rollover
data for a monopoly WSP and its users. And the work in
[9] further designs the price of the rollover data plan to
2maximize the WSP’s revenue. However, all these works
only consider the monopoly WSP, and the competition
between the WSPs (common in almost all data markets)
has not been investigated yet. There are some prior works
on generic network’s competition or user dynamics (e.g.,
[10], [11], [12]). The work in [10] studies two interconnected
service providers’ timing of upgrading architecture, where
one provider’s upgrade also benefits the other due to the
network effect. This “free-rider” effect gives the other op-
erator a temptation to postpone its upgrade or even not
upgrade. The work in [11] studies the cellular operators’
timing of 4G network upgrade and shows that operators
select different upgrade times to avoid severe competition.
However, these works focus on the upgrade competition
between symmetric operators, where operators are assumed
to have identical market share. [12] studies the duopoly
competition in spectrum leasing market but only looked at
a static model in one-shot. [13] analyzes the user dynamics
under innovative mobile social services rather than innova-
tive data plans. In our paper, we look at a different problem
without free riding effect and will show that the disparity of
market shares will significantly affect the WSPs’ timing of
offering innovative data plans under users dynamics.
In this paper, we analyze the timing of competitive
WSPs to announce the rollover or shared data plan, and
answer why the WSPs in some countries prefer to offer
simultaneously yet some other countries have asymmetric
timing or no planning for innovative data plans. Our key
novelty and main contributions are summarized as follows.
• Economics of innovative data plans in competitive mar-
kets: To our best knowledge, this is the first paper
to provide game theoretic modelling and analysis of
innovative data plans in competitive data markets.
We practically model the dynamic user arrival and
user churn between WSPs, and analytically charac-
terize the pros and cons of innovative data plans for
each WSP. We formulate the WSPs’ interactions as
a non-cooperative game, where each WSP seeks the
trade-off between the increase of market share and
the loss of overage charges.
• Equilibrium timing for innovative data plans: By ana-
lyzing the non-cooperative timing game, our equi-
librium analysis shows that the WSP with small
market share would like to offer the rollover or
shared data plan first to attract significantly more
users, while the WSP with large market share prefers
to announce later to avoid the immediate revenue
(overage charge) loss. In a fast-growing market with
many new user arrivals, we show that WSPs with
similar market shares will offer the data plans si-
multaneously. However, given few new users, these
WSPs may not offer any new plan, as the benefit
from attracting new users cannot compensate for
the immediate revenue loss. Perhaps surprisingly, we
show that WSPs may not benefit from the option of
innovative data plans, and their profits can decrease
with new user number.
• Comparison between rollover and shared data plans: In
rollover data plan, a WSP’s profit change is not af-
fected by heavy users, while the timing of the shared
data plan depends on the composition of light and
heavy users in a family. In a saturated market with
few new users, WSPs with similar market shares will
not offer rollover data plans due to the great loss
of overage charges, whereas they will still consider
shared data plans based on the proportions of (heavy,
heavy) and (heavy, light) families.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model and problem formulation is given in Section 2. In
Section 3, WSPs’ optimal decisions under rollover data plan
is analyzed and the equilibrium rollover time is presented.
In Section 4, we study the WSPs’ equilibrium timing under
shared data plan. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a typical wireless data service market including
competitive WSPs. For ease of exposition, we consider the
two WSPs case as in [10], [11]. Later in Section 3, we
also discuss the case with arbitrary number of symmetric
WSPs. In reality, the data prices are similar for the WSPs
with similar service quality. For example, in the USA, the
subscription fee for 2 GB data is 20 USD per month for both
Verizon and T-mobile. Thus, we assume that the WSPs offer
the two-part tariff data plan (P,B, p) with the same data
price to their users, where a user is given a monthly data
cap B at a fixed lump-sum fee P , and should pay for extra
data beyond B at a costly unit price p. Without considering
any future new user, there are 2N users currently and WSP
i, i ∈ {1, 2} covers 2Ni users with current market share
ηi = Ni/N .
In the following, we will first introduce the user model in
the traditional data plan before the introduction of any inno-
vative data plan. Then we will characterize the WSPs’ pros
and cons for upgrading traditional plans to rollover and
shared data plans, and formulate the game theoretic mod-
els for the WSPs’ timing competition. The key parameters
which will be used throughout the paper are summarized
in Table 1.
TABLE 1: Key Notations and Their Physical Meaning
Symbol Description
B subscribed data quota
P subscription fee
p unit price for extra data
α percentage of heavy users
Dl, Dh maximum monthly data usage of light users,
heavy users
dl, dh minimum monthly data usage of light users,
heavy users
ul, uh monthly data usage of light users, heavy users
ηi initial market share for WSP i
η0 initial proportion of new users to existing users
λ0, λ new user arrival rate and churn rate
S discount rate over time
In both the existing and new user pools, we classify the
data users into two types according to their monthly data
usage behaviors: α ∈ (0, 1) percentage of heavy users who
may exceed the data quota and 1 − α percentage of light
users who will not exceed the data quota. For example,
according to [14], more than 25% of AT&T customers (heavy
users) paid an overage charge within six months. A light
3user’s monthly data usage ul is a random variable on
his possible usage range dl ≤ ul ≤ Dl, where dl and
Dl are the minimum and maximum monthly data usage,
respectively. As a light users seldom exceeds the data cap
B (i.e., Dl ≤ B), his expected monthly cost is ECl = P .
Similarly, a heavy user’s monthly data usage uh is a random
variable with probability density function fh(uh) on his
possible usage range dh ≤ uh ≤ Dh. In the existing two-
part tariff, given Dh > B, a heavy user may overuse and
his monthly cost by consuming uh is
Ch = P + p(uh −B)
+, (1)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0).
By taking the expectation of (1) with respect to uh, the
heavy user’s expected cost is
ECh = P + p
∫ Dh
B
(uh −B)fh(uh)duh. (2)
Take the uniform distribution as in [15] as an example,
e.g., fh(uh) =
1
Dh−dh
for a heavy user, the heavy user’s
expected cost is
ECh = P + p
(Dh −B)
2
2Dh
. (3)
Note that the data usage distribution will only affect the
users’ expected cost reduction under innovative data plan
and will not affect the WSPs’ equilibrium timing analysis as
shown in Sections 3 and 4.
Besides the existing 2N users, there are potentially 2N0
new users and they can add proportion η0 = N0/N to the
market, where η0 may be even larger than 1. The number of
new users is different across countries, e.g., large in China
but small in USA. These new users will gradually join the
market in the long run. Many of them are heavy users who
are sensitive to the overage charge of the existing plan, but
they will consider joining the innovative data plan (if any)
for cost-saving. Besides the new user arrival, the existing
users of a WSP will also consider switching to the other
WSP’s innovative data plan. Due to the switching cost cs
for changing the subscribed WSP (e.g., contract termination
fee), the existing users will switch from oneWSP to the other
(first providing innovative data plan) gradually rather than
all at once [11]. As new user arrival or existing user churn
between WSPs takes time, we denote the new user arrival
rate as λ0 and existing user churn rate as λ, respectively,
both of which depend on the user’s cost reduction/saving
∆ under the new innovative data plan. Note that we will
estimate ∆ according to the corresponding innovative data
plan as specified later. If the cost reduction is large, the
users will switch to the innovative data plan with large rates
λ, λ0. Moreover, for the users who already subscribed to the
WSP’s innovative data plan to enjoy the cost reduction ∆,
they will not switch to the other WSP even when the latter
party also offers the innovative data plan later due to the
switching cost and lock-in effect. This lock-in effect actually
motivates the WSPs to compete to first offer innovative data
plans.
Mathematically, we use differential equations to model
the impact of switching cost cs and its resultant lock-in
effect. Suppose WSP i upgrades earlier than WSP j, i.e.,
Ti < Tj , WSP j’s left user share/proportion ηj(t) is dy-
namically shrinking and follows
dηj(t)
dt
= −λ(cs,∆)ηj(t), t ∈ [Ti, Tj], (4)
where ηj(t) starts with ηj initially and λ(cs,∆) is the user
churn rate. In general, λ(cs,∆) increases with cost reduction
∆ under the new data plan, and decreases with cs which
keeps users from churning. Note that the user churn rate
is also affected by the difference between the two WSPs’
wireless service qualities (e.g., signal coverage and the delay
of data delivery), and the users will churn to the WSP with
better service quality at a larger churn rate. Our analysis
methods in Sections 3 and 4 still apply for the asymmetric
churn rates case, though the analysis is more complicated
with more cases. After Tj , WSP j’s users also enjoy the
cost reduction and will no longer churn to WSP i to avoid
switching cost. By solving (4), we have
ηj(t) = e
−λ(cs,∆)(t−Ti)ηj , t ∈ [Ti, Tj ]. (5)
Similar to [11], we can validate the value of λ by using real
data.
Similarly, given the initial proportion of new users η0,
the dynamic of the left user proportion η0(t) of new users is
dη0(t)
dt
= −λ0(∆)η0(t), t ∈ [Ti,∞), (6)
where λ0(∆) increases with the cost reduction ∆ and does
not depend on cs, since new users are not locked in any
WSP initially. By solving (6), we have
η0(t) = e
−λ0(∆)(t−Ti)η0, t ∈ [Ti,∞). (7)
Then, for WSP i who upgrades first at time Ti, its user
share ηi(t) at time t increases from its initial market share ηi
and follows
ηi(t) = ηi + (1− e
−λ(cs,∆)(t−Ti))ηj + (1−e
−λ0(∆)(t−Ti))η0,
t ∈ [Ti, Tj ] (8)
In the following, we will formulate the WSPs’ timing
problems for providing rollover and shared data plans,
respectively.
2.1 Problem Formulation for Rollover Data Plan
To attract users from the new user pool and the other WSP,
a WSP can provide rollover data plan at a proper time. Note
that light users under-use the data quota and upgrading
to rollover plan or not does not change their costs and
subscription. The rollover upgrade from the existing plan
only affects the heavy users’ subscription (from the new user
pool and the other WSP). Thus, we only need to consider the
heavy users who can reduce their overage charges by using
the rollover. We consider the typical rollover data plan (e.g.,
provided by AT&T), where the WSP allows its users to keep
unused data quota (B − uh(t − 1))
+ only from last month
t − 1 to next month t, and the rollover data is consumed
only after the current month’s data quota is used up. At
time t, the heavy user’s data quota now increases from B to
B + (B − uh(t − 1))
+ and his monthly cost by consuming
random uh(t) in this month is
Crh(t) = P + p
(
uh(t)−B − (B − uh(t− 1))
+
)+
. (9)
4(a) Phase I: 0 ≤ t ≤ Ti (b) Phase II: Ti < t ≤ Tj (c) Phase III: t > Tj
Fig. 2: Illustration of dynamic (heavy) user subscription when WSP i chooses rollover upgrade earlier than WSP j (Ti < Tj ): Phase I without rollover data, Phase II
with WSP i’s rollover service, Phase III with both WSPs’ rollover services.
By taking expectation of (9) with respect to both uh(t)
and uh(t − 1), the heavy user’s expected cost under the
rollover data plan is
ECrh =P + p
∫ Dh
ξ
(
uh(t)− ξ
)
fh(uh(t))duh(t). (10)
where ξ = B +
∫ B
dh
(B − uh(t− 1))fh(uh(t− 1))duh(t− 1).
Take the uniform distribution as an example, we derive
the heavy user’s expected cost under the rollover data plan
as follows.
Lemma 2.1. For the uniform distribution, the heavy user’s
expected cost under the rollover data plan is
ECrh =


P + p 2(Dh−B)
3
3D2
h
, if B < Dh ≤ 2B;
P + p(2(Dh−B)
3
3D2
h
− (Dh−2B)
3
6D2
h
), if Dh > 2B,
(11)
which is smaller than traditional cost ECh in (3).
As shown in Fig. 1, the cost reduction ECh − EC
r
h after
adding rollover data first increases with the maximum data
usage Dh as the heavy user is more likely to rollover data
and save cost. The cost reduction then decreases as there is
less left data to rollover.
Due to the cost saving, heavy users will gradually churn
to the WSP with rollover data upgrade. Fig. 2 illustrates
how existing heavy users switch from WSP i to WSP j and
how new (heavy) users choose WSPs over the time horizon
t. Time 0 means the earliest possible time for data plan
upgrade. Here we suppose WSP i upgrades earlier than
WSP j (i.e., Ti ≤ Tj) in Fig. 2.
1 As explained earlier, we
do not consider existing and new light users, as they are
not affected by the rollover data plan and do not matter the
WSPs’ upgrade timing. There are three phases for dynamic
user subscription:
• Phase I (0 ≤ t ≤ Ti) as in Fig. 2(a). No WSP offers
the rollover data plan. Thus no existing heavy user
switches between WSPs and no new heavy user joins
any network.
• Phase II (Ti < t ≤ Tj) as in Fig. 2(b). WSP i offers
the rollover data plan at time Ti but WSP j has not.
The existing heavy users of WSP i benefit from the
upgrade to rollover data plan immediately from time
Ti, and the heavy users of WSP j and the new user
1. If Ti = Tj , we do not have Phase II in Fig. 2.
pool gradually join WSP i at rates λ and λ0, respec-
tively. The number of heavy users switched from
WSP j to i from time Ti to t is 2αNj(1 − e
−λ(t−Ti)),
where there are originally 2αNj users in WSP j.
The number of new heavy users joining WSP i is
2αN0(1− e
−λ0(t−Ti)).
• Phase III (t > Tj) as in Fig. 2(c). Both WSPs offer
rollover data plans, and no existing users will switch
to the other WSP. The new heavy users are equally
likely to subscribe to both WSPs (for cost saving)
since Tj . There are only 2αN0e
−λ0(Tj−Ti) left in the
new heavy user pool at time Tj , and the numbers
of new heavy users subscribed to each WSP from
time Tj to t are the same, i.e., αN0e
−λ0(Tj−Ti)(1 −
e−λ0(t−Tj)).
Based on the dynamic subscription of users over the
three phases, we are ready to characterize the profits of
WSPs. In reality, each WSP values its future profit less
importantly due to depreciation. We denote the discount
rate over time as S > 0, and model the discount factor till
time t as e−St as in [16]. Without offering rollover data plan
(i.e., Ti = Tj = ∞), the long-term profit of WSP i, i = 1, 2,
from its existing heavy users is
Ri =
∫ ∞
0
2αNiEChe
−Stdt = 2αNiECh
1
S
, (12)
where ECh is given in (3).
Given WSP j’s rollover time Tj ≥ 0, WSP i can choose
to rollover earlier or later than WSP j. As shown in Fig. 2,
WSP i’s long-term profits through the three time phases for
Ti ≤ Tj and Ti > Tj are given in (13) and (14), respectively.
Based on these results, we describe the non-cooperative
timing game for rollover data plan as follows.
• Players: WSPs 1 and 2.
• Strategy spaces: WSP i ∈ {1, 2} can choose rollover
time Ti from the feasible set Ti = [0,∞].
• Payoff functions: WSP i ∈ {1, 2} wants to maximize
its profit defined in (13) and (14).
2.2 Problem Formulation for Shared Data Plan
To attract more subscribers, a WSP can also choose to
provide shared data plan at a proper time. We assume
the average family size for choosing a shared data plan is
two, and our analysis can also be extended to the case of
three or more members in an average family. By combining
5R
r,≤
i =
∫ Ti
0
2αNiEChe
−Stdt+
∫ Tj
Ti
(
2αNj(1 − e
−λ(t−Ti))ECrh + 2αNiEC
r
h + 2αN0(1 − e
−λ0(t−Ti))ECrh
)
e−Stdt
+
∫ ∞
Tj
(
2αNj(1 − e
−λ(Tj−Ti))ECrh + 2αNiEC
r
h + αN0e
−λ0(Tj−Ti)(1− e−λ0(t−Tj))ECrh + 2αN0(1− e
−λ0(Tj−Ti))ECrh
)
e−Stdt.
(13)
R
r,>
i =
∫ Tj
0
2αNiEChe
−Stdt +
∫ Ti
Tj
2αNie
−λ(t−Tj)EChe
−Stdt+
∫ ∞
Ti
(
2αNie
−λ(Ti−Tj) + αN0e
−λ0(Ti−Tj)(1 − e−λ0(t−Ti))
)
ECrhe
−Stdt.
(14)
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Fig. 1: Heavy user’s expected cost reduction ECh − EC
r
h vs his maximum data
usage Dh when B = 3 GB, p = 10 USD/GB.
two individual users’ data cap B and lump sum fee P ,
the shared data plan is (2P, 2B, p) for the whole family.
Suppose two users (no matter heavy or light users) form
a family randomly, and each user is a heavy user with
probability α. Based on different combinations of heavy and
light users, the proportions of (heavy, heavy), (heavy, light)
and (light, light) families are α2, 2α(1 − α) and (1 − α)2,
respectively. Compared to the rollover data plan where a
WSP’s profit change is only affected by heavy users, the tim-
ing of the shared data plan here depends on the composition
of light and heavy users in a family. A light user in a (heavy,
light) family can also change to the WSP with shared data
plan to reduce the cost of the heavy user in the same family.
We note that in each of the (light, light) families, the two
users do not benefit from the shared data plan. This type
of families does not affect the WSPs’ profit change after the
shared data plan, and we only need to consider the (heavy,
heavy) and (heavy, light) families when deciding the timing
of offering shared data plan. Similarly, we do not consider
bachelordom users without family. For each type of families,
the proportion of both family users choosing the same WSP
i of market share ηi is η
2
i , and we call such families as pure
families. Similarly, the proportion of each user choosing a
different WSP is 2ηiηj , and we call such families as mixed
families.
Under the shared data plan, the family’s monthly cost is
Cs = 2P + p(u− 2B)
+, (15)
where random variable u is the total family data usage: u =
uh + ul for a (heavy, light) family and u = uh + uh for a
(heavy, heavy) family.
By taking the expectation of (15) with respect to u, the
expected costs of (heavy, light) and (heavy, heavy) families
are
ECh,l = 2P + p
∫ Dl+Dh
2B
(u− 2B)f(u)du, (16)
and
ECh,h = 2P + p
∫ Dh+Dh
2B
(u− 2B)f(u)du. (17)
Take the uniform distribution of users’ data usage as an
example, the distribution of u for a (heavy, light) family is
f(u) =


u
DlDh
, if 0 ≤ u ≤ Dl;
1
Dh
, if Dl < u ≤ Dh;
Dl+Dh−u
DlDh
, if Dh < u ≤ Dl +Dh.
(18)
For a (heavy, heavy) family, its distribution of u is the
similar as (18) by letting Dl = Dh. Then, we obtain the
expected costs of (heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light) families
as follows.
Lemma 2.2. For the uniform distribution of users’ data
usage, the (heavy, heavy) family’s expected cost is
ECh,h =
{
2P + 4p
3D2
h
(Dh −B)
3, if Dh ≤ 2B;
2P + p
D2
h
(D3h − 2BD
2
h +
4
3B
3), if Dh > 2B.
(19)
and the (heavy, light) family’s expected cost is
ECh,l =


2P + p6DhDl (Dh +Dl − 2B)
3, if Dh ≤ 2B;
2P + p
Dh
(
D2h
2 − 2BDh + 2B
2
+
D2l
6 +
DhDl
2 − BDl), if Dh > 2B.
(20)
Due to the overage cost saving, (heavy, heavy) and
(heavy, light) families will gradually churn to the WSP
with shared data upgrade. Fig. 3 illustrates how existing
(heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light) families switch from one
WSP to another and how new (heavy, heavy) and (heavy,
light) families choose WSPs in the time horizon t. Here we
supposeWSP i upgrades earlier thanWSP j (i.e., Ti ≤ Tj) in
Fig. 3 and can simply skip Phase II if Ti = Tj . As explained
earlier, here we do not count existing and new (light, light)
families, as they are not affected by the shared data plan and
do not matter the timing decisions.
• Phase I (0 ≤ t ≤ Ti) as in Fig. 3(a). No WSP offers
the shared data plan. Thus, no existing user switches
between WSPs and no new user joins any network.
• Phase II (Ti < t ≤ Tj) as in Fig. 3(b). WSP i offers
the shared data plan at time Ti but WSP j has not. If
both users in a family have subscribed to WSP i, they
can upgrade to the shared data plan immediately at
time Ti. Otherwise, the existing families (with at least
one family member in WSP j) and the new families
will join WSP i gradually at churn rates λ and λ0,
6(a) Phase I: 0 ≤ t ≤ Ti (b) Phase II: Ti < t ≤ Tj (c) Phase III: t > Tj
Fig. 3: Illustration of (heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light) families subscription under WSPs’ shared data plans when WSP i upgrades earlier than WSP j (Ti < Tj ): Phase
I without shared data, Phase II with WSP i’s shared data service, Phase III with both WSPs’ shared data services.
R
s,≤
i =
(
EN(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
) + η2iN
1
λ+ S
E − ηiND
1
S
+ ηiηjND
1
λ+ S
+N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
)
)
e−STi − (1− ηi)NE(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
)e−(λ+S)Tj+λTi
−
1
2
N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
)e−(λ0+S)Tj+λ0Ti + ηiND
1
S
,
(22)
R
s,>
i =ηiND
1
S
− ηiND(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
)e−STj + ηiN(E
1
S
− ηjE
1
λ+ S
− ηiD
1
λ+ S
)e−(λ+S)Ti+λTj +
1
2
N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
)e−(λ0+S)Ti+λ0Tj .
(23)
respectively. Thus, the subscribed families to WSP
i from Ti to t are: (i) η
2
i α
2N pure (heavy, heavy)
families from WSP i; (ii) η2jα
2N(1 − e−λ(t−Ti)) pure
(heavy, heavy) families from WSP j, where there
are originally η2jα
2N pure (heavy, heavy) families in
WSP j; (iii) 2ηiηjα
2N(1 − e−λ(t−Ti)) mixed (heavy,
heavy) families; (iv) 2η2i α(1 − α)N pure (heavy,
light) families from WSP i; (v) 2η2jα(1 − α)N(1 −
e−λ(t−Ti)) pure (heavy, light) families from WSP j;
(vi) 4ηiηjα(1 − α)N(1 − e
−λ(t−Ti)) mixed (heavy,
light) families; (vii) α2N0(1−e
−λ0(t−Ti)) new (heavy,
heavy) families; (vii) 2α(1−α)N0(1−e
−λ0(t−Ti)) new
(heavy, light) families.
• Phase III (t > Tj) as in Fig. 3(c). Both WSPs offer
the shared data plan, and no pure families will
switch to the other WSP. The mixed families and the
new families are equally likely to subscribe to the
two WSPs. Thus, a number ηiηjα
2Ne−λ(Tj−Ti)(1 −
e−λ(t−Tj)) of mixed (heavy, heavy) families and a
number 2ηiηjα(1 − α)Ne
−λ(Tj−Ti)(1 − e−λ(t−Tj))
of mixed (heavy, light) families will subscribe to
each WSP from time Tj to t. And the number
of new (heavy, heavy) families and (heavy, light)
families subscribed to each WSP from time Tj to
t are 12α
2N0e
−λ0(Tj−Ti)(1 − e−λ0(t−Tj)) and α(1 −
α)N0e
−λ0(Tj−Ti)(1 − e−λ0(t−Tj)), respectively.
Based on the dynamic subscription of users over the
three phases, we can characterize the profits of WSPs as fol-
lows. Without offering shared data plan (i.e., Ti = Tj =∞),
the long-term profit of WSP i, i = 1, 2, from its existing
(heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light) families is
Rsi =
∫ ∞
0
(2αηiNECh + 2ηiNα(1− α)ECl)e
−Stdt
=(2αηiNECh + 2ηiNα(1− α)ECl)
1
S
.
(21)
WSP i’s long-term profits through the three time phases
for Ti ≤ Tj and Ti > Tj cases are given in (22) and (23),
respectively, where
D = 2αECh + 2α(1− α)ECl, (24)
E = α2ECh,h + 2α(1− α)ECh,l. (25)
Similar to the timing game of rollover data plan, we use a
noncooperative game to model the interactions between the
two WSPs, where each of them seeks to maximize its profit
defined in (22) and (23) by choosing the optimal timing
of offering the shared data plan. In the following, we will
analyze the timing equilibrium for the rollover data plan in
Section 3 and shared data plan in Section 4.
3 TIMING EQUILIBRIUM FOR ROLLOVER DATA
PLAN
By announcing the rollover data plan, a WSP loses its
immediate revenue from its existing users as the overage
charge reduces (from ECh in (3) to EC
r
h in (11)), but it can
gradually increase profit by attracting new users and those
from the other WSP. Note that as existing users are mainly
adults and potential new users could be teenagers who take
time to mature, we expect λ0 < λ in practice. In this section,
we first analyze WSP i’s best rollover timing given anyWSP
j’s rollover time Tj , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Then, we
derive the equilibrium rollover timing of both WSPs.
By examining the first-order conditions of WSP’s profit
before and after its competitor’s rollover, we derive the
conditions that WSP i will rollover first.
Lemma 3.1. Given WSP j’s rollover time Tj , WSP i will
upgrade to rollover data plan earlier than WSP j ( i.e.,
Ti ≤ Tj), if and only if one of the following conditions
holds:
7(
2α(NiECh −NEC
r
h +Nj
S
λ+ S
ECrh) − 2αN0
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh
)
e−STi − 2αNj (
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrhe
−STj e−λ(Tj−Ti)
− αN0(
λ0
S
−
λ0
λ0 + S
)ECrhe
−STj e−λ0(Tj−Ti) = 0.
(27)
(I) Reduction of overage charge after rollover is
mild, i.e., κi ≤ 1, where
κi =
2ηi(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+S
S
)
η0ECrh
λ0
S
. (26)
(II) κi > 1 yet earlier upgrade’s gain in market
share still exceeds the later upgrade’s bene-
fit of overage charges (i.e., Rr,≤i (Tˆi) in (13)
is larger than Rr,>i (Tj +
log κi
λ−λ0
) in (14)). Here,
WSP i’s best upgrade time after Tj is Tj +
log κi
λ−λ0
, and the best time before Tj is Tˆi =
argmax(Rr,≤i (T˜i), R
r,≤
i (0), R
r,≤
i (Tj)), where T˜i
is the solution to (27).
Proof: If κi ≤ 1, we have
∂R
r,>
i
(Ti,Tj)
∂Ti
≤ 0. Thus, WSP i
will not offer rollover later than WSP j.
If κi > 1, WSP i will choose its upgrade time by
comparing its profits before and after WSP j’s rollover.
Note that
∂2R
r,>
i
(Ti,Tj)
∂T 2i
< 0. By letting
∂R
r,>
i
(Ti,Tj)
∂Ti
= 0,
we have WSP i’s best upgrade time after Tj as Tj +
log κi
λ−λ0
.
Then, we derive the optimal time before Tj . Denote T˜i
as the solution to
∂R
r,≤
i (Ti,Tj)
∂Ti
= 0, which can be written
as (27). Note that T˜i should be less than Tj and larger
than 0. Thus, by comparing the profits of extreme and
boundary points, we have the best time before Tj as
Tˆi = argmax(R
r,≤
i (T˜i), R
r,≤
i (0), R
r,≤
i (Tj)). Therefore, WSP
i will upgrade to rollover data plan earlier than WSP j if
Rr,≤i (Tˆi) ≥ R
r,>
i (Tj +
log κi
λ−λ0
).
According to Lemma 3.1, WSP i’s best response can be
derived immediately in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Given WSP j’s rollover time Tj , WSP i’s
best rollover time T ∗i (Tj) is
• If Tj = 0, then
T ∗i (Tj) =
{
0, if κi ≤ 1;
log κi
λ−λ0
, if κi > 1.
(28)
• If Tj > 0, then
T ∗i (Tj) =
{
Tˆi, if (I) or (II) holds;
Tj +
log κi
λ−λ0
, Otherwise.
(29)
According to Proposition 3.1, WSP i will postpone its
rollover time if the heavy user’s overage cost reduction
(from ECh in (3) to EC
r
h in (11)) is large and the new user
population is small. In reality, the heavy user’s cost reduc-
tion after rollover is found not huge [17], and we consider an
upper bound for the cost reduction, i.e., ECh < EC
r
h
2λ+S
S
.2
Theorem 3.1. The WSPs’ equilibrium timing of rollover data
plans is summarized as follows (see Fig. 4):
2. For the case when ECh ≥ EC
r
h
2λ+S
S
, we can show that the
equilibrium analysis is similar, and in the equilibrium results that
only the medium η0 regime includes more tedious cases to quantify
equilibrium timing.
• If ECh ≤ EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, the overage charge reduction
after rollover is mild and the two WSPs will immedi-
ately upgrade their data plans (i.e., T nei = T
ne
j = 0),
as shown in Fig. 4(a).
• If ECh > EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, the WSPs’ equilibrium rollover
timing depends on the new user proportion η0 and
the WSPs’ market shares:
1) Large η0 regime (η0 ≥
2S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)): both
WSPs will offer rollover data plans immedi-
ately to attract many new (heavy) users (i.e.,
T nei = T
ne
j = 0), as shown in Fig. 4(a).
2) Medium η0 regime (η¯0 < η0 <
2S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)
with η¯0 as the solution to (30)): the median
size of new users and the other WSP’s many
users allure the WSP with a small market
share (less than η
r
in (31)3) to upgrade imme-
diately, and the other WSP purposely waits
and upgrades at time log κi
λ−λ0
> 0, i ∈ {1, 2}.
If the two WSPs have similar market shares
(between ηr and 1 − ηr), they will upgrade
immediately to keep their existing users and
attract new users (see Fig. 4(b)).
3) Small η0 regime (0 ≤ η0 ≤ η¯0): the small size
of new users cannot allure the two WSPs with
similar market shares (between η¯r and 1 −
η¯r with η¯r as the solution of (32)) to upgrade
to rollover data plan (i.e., T nei = T
ne
j = ∞).
Only the WSP of small market share (less than
η¯r) still chooses to upgrade to attract the other
WSP’s large market share, and the other will
still upgrade after log κi
λ−λ0
, i ∈ {1, 2} to keep its
market share to some extent (see Fig. 4(c)).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in Appendix A of the
supplemental material. Then, we can conclude that
• BothWSPs will offer rollover data plans immediately
if the heavy user’s cost reduction (i.e., ECh−EC
r
h) is
small or the new user population is large.
• The WSP with small market share prefers to rollover
first as it can attract many users at least from the
other WSP. While the WSP with large market share
prefers late rollover to avoid the immediate revenue
loss, and it still chooses rollover upgrade to keep its
market share.
• Given few new users and large cost reduction from
heavy users, the WSPs with similar market shares
will not rollover as the profit received from the new
users cannot compensate for the revenue loss due to
users’ cost reduction.
These results match well with our industry observations
about rollover data plans. For example, in China, the quar-
3. η˜r in (31) is the solution of R
r,≤
i (Ti = 0, Tj =
log κj
λ−λ0
) =
R
r,>
i
(Tj = 0, Ti =
log κi
λ−λ0
) as a function of ηi.
8αNECh − 2αNEC
r
h + αN
S
λ+ S
ECrh − 2αη0N
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh − αN(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrh
( η0ECrh λ0S
ECh − EC
r
h
λ+S
S
) λ+S
λ−λ0
+ αη0N(
λ0
λ0 + S
−
λ0
S
)ECrh
( η0ECrh λ0S
ECh − EC
r
h
λ+S
S
)λ0+S
λ−λ0 = 0,
(30)
ηr = max
(
1− η˜r ,min
(
max(1 − η¯r ,
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+S
S
)
),min(η¯r , 1−
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+S
S
)
)
))
. (31)
2α(NiECh −NEC
r
h +Nj
S
λ+ S
ECrh −N0
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh)− 2αNj(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrh(
1
κj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0 − αN0(
λ0
S
−
λ0
λ0 + S
)ECrh(
1
κj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 = 0. (32)
(a) large η0 regime or ECh ≤ EC
r
h
λ+S
S
case
(b) Medium η0 regime
(c) Small η0 regime
Fig. 4: Equilibrium rollover time vs new user proportion η0 and WSP i’s market
share.
terly new customers growth is larger than 10%, which falls
into the large new user regime in Fig. 4(a). Thus the two
major WSPs, China Mobile and China Unicom, announced
the rollover data plan at the same time [18]. In the USA,
the quarterly new customers growth is around 2% and the
WSPs with diverse market shares chose rollover sequen-
tially, i.e., T-mobile with the small market share announced
rollover first in 2014, which is followed by AT&T in 2015
[19]. In a saturated market like Singapore, the quarterly new
customers growth is trivial, which can be viewed as the
small new user regime. So far, no WSP in this market has
announced rollover data since the involved WSPs’ market
shares are similar.
3.1 Multiple WSPs’ Equilibrium Timing
TABLE 2: Equilibrium Timing for three WSPs with market shares η1 = 0.1, η2 =
0.3, η3 = 0.6. The expected cost EC
r
h under rollover data plan is fixed as 3,
and we change the new user population η0 and the initial cost ECh to alter
∆ = ECh − EC
r
h.
ECh η0 Equilibrium Timing
(3, 5.6] 0.3 Tne1 = T
ne
2 = T
ne
3 = 0
(5.6, 8.5] 0.3 0 = Tne1 = T
ne
2 < T
ne
3
(8.5, 10] 0.3 0 = Tne1 < T
ne
2 < T
ne
3
(10, 18] 0.3 0 = Tne1 < T
ne
2 = T
ne
3
(18,∞] 0.3 Tne1 = T
ne
2 = T
ne
3 =∞
5.5 0.1 0 = Tne1 = T
ne
2 < T
ne
3
For multiple asymmetric WSPs, we can numerically
show the equilibrium rollover timing in Table 2, where the
three WSPs have market shares η1 = 0.1, η2 = 0.3, η3 = 0.6
initially. As shown in Table 2, when the overage charge
cost reduction after rollover is mild, i.e., from initial cost
ECh ∈ (3, 5.6] to EC
r
h = 3 under the rollover data plan,
the three WSPs will immediately upgrade their data plans,
i.e., T ne1 = T
ne
2 = T
ne
3 = 0 to equally attract the sizable
new users with large churn rate η0 = 0.3. As the cost
reduction increases, i.e., ECh ∈ (5.6, 8.5], the WSPs with
smaller market share will upgrade immediately to attract
the new users and other WSP’s large market share, i.e.,
T ne1 = T
ne
2 = 0, and the WSP with the largest market
share purposely waits and upgrades at time T ne3 > 0 to
avoid the immediate revenue loss from its existing users.
If the cost reduction further increases, i.e., ECh ∈ (8.5, 10],
only the WSP with the smallest market share will upgrade
immediately and the other two WSPs will wait and up-
grade successively according to their current market share,
i.e., 0 < T ne2 < T
ne
3 . For larger cost reduction regime
ECh ∈ (10, 18], only theWSPwith the smallest market share
will upgrade immediately, and the second largest WSP will
further postpone its upgrade timing and upgrade together
with the largest WSP 3, i.e., T ne2 = T
ne
3 > 0. For very large
cost reduction regime ECh ∈ (18,∞], the WSPs will not
upgrade to rollover data plan, i.e., T ne1 = T
ne
2 = T
ne
3 = ∞,
as the increased profit from the switched users and new
users cannot compensate for the profit loss from existing
users. Moreover, we show that for the mild cost reduction,
i.e., ECh = 5.5, as the proportion of new users η0 decreases
from 0.3 to 0.1, the equilibrium rollover timing will change
from T ne1 = T
ne
2 = T
ne
3 = 0 to 0 = T
ne
1 = T
ne
2 < T
ne
3 .
That is to say, the WSP 3 with the largest market share will
postpone its upgrade time as the small new user population
cannot justify the reduction of immediate overage charges
due to rollover. The numerical results shown in Table 2
for multiple WSPs coincide with the key results of two-
WSP case in Theorem 3.1 and Fig. 4. Moreover, for multiple
symmetric WSPs, we have the following corollary, which is
consistent with Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. For multiple symmetric WSPs, they will
offer rollover immediately at the same time if ECh −
ECrh
λ+S
S
< η0EC
r
h
λ0
S
for large η0 or mild cost reduction.
Proof: Suppose there areM≥ 2 symmetric WSPs. Note
that a WSP’s existing users are only affected by the WSP
who offers rollover first as the existing users start to churn
to the earlier rollover WSP gradually. For any WSP i ∈ M,
denote T0 as the WSPs who offers rollover first. Then, WSP
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Fig. 5: WSPs’ equilibrium profits at equilibrium rollover time versus WSP i’s market share (ηi or 1− ηj ) and new user proportion η0.
i ∈M will not offer rollover latest if
∂Rr,>i
∂Ti
=2α
N
M
(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+ S
S
)eλT0−(λ+S)Ti
− 2α
N0
M
ECrh
λ0
S
eλ0T0−(λ0+S)Ti < 0,
(33)
i.e., N
M
(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+S
S
) < N0
M
ECrh
λ0
S
. As a result, all WSPs
prefer rollover earlier, which results in the equilibrium point
that all WSPs offer rollover at the beginning.
Remark 3.1. Note that for multiple symmetric WSPs, they
may have asymmetric upgrade timing. For example, for
non-trivial overage charge cost reduction and not large
new user population, e.g., ECh = 6,EC
r
h = 3, η0 = 0.3,
two out of the three WSPs with market shares η1 = η2 =
η3 will upgrade immediately to attract the new users and
switched users, i.e., 0 = T ne1 = T
ne
2 < T
ne
3 . Given the
equilibrium rollover timing of the two WSPs, if the third
WSP still chooses to upgrade at the beginning, it can
only attract the new users and no switched users from
the other WSPs will join it. Therefore, it is better for the
third WSP to wait and upgrade at time T ne3 > 0 as the
revenue received from the new users cannot compensate
for the revenue loss from existing users.
3.2 WSPs’ Profits at Equilibrium Timing
Now we are ready to discuss the duopoly WSPs’ profits
at the equilibrium. By substituting the equilibrium rollover
time in Theorem 3.1 to (13) and (14), we can derive the
equilibrium profits of the two WSPs. At the equilibrium
rollover timing, the profit of WSP i, i = 1, 2 is given as
follows:
• The WSP i’s profit for rollover at the same time (i.e.,
T nei = T
ne
j = 0) is
R¯ri = 2αNiEC
r
h
1
S
+ αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)ECrh. (34)
• The WSP i’s profit for first rollover (i.e., T nei = 0,
T nej =
log κj
λ−λ0
) is
R¯r,≤i =2αNEC
r
h
1
S
− 2αNjEC
r
h
1
S + λ
− 2αNjEC
r
h(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
)(
1
κj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+ 2αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)ECrh
− αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)(
1
κj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 ECrh.
(35)
• The WSP i’s profit for late rollover (i.e., T nei =
log κi
λ−λ0
,
T nej = 0) is
R¯r,>i =2αNi
1
λ+ S
ECh(1 − (
1
κi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0 )
+ 2αNi
1
S
ECrh(
1
κi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+ αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)(
1
κi
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 ECrh.
(36)
If the new user population is extremely large, it is
manifest that the WSPs always gain profit by upgrading to
rollover data. Next, we look at the non-trivial case that the
number of new users is smaller than that of the existing
users, i.e., η0 < 1. By comparing WSP i’s profits before
and after rollover at the equilibrium, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2. At the equilibrium, there exists a unique
threshold ηthi ∈ [0, 1] such that WSP i gains profit by
data rollover if ηi ≤ η
th
i , and loses profit if ηi > η
th
i .
The Proof of Proposition 3.2 is given in Appendix B of
the supplemental material.
If a WSP has a small market share, it can still increase
its profit by first rollover and attracting many users from
the other WSP. While for the WSP with already a large
market share, the small new user population cannot justify
the reduction of overage charges due to rollover. In the
following, we present numerical results in Figs. 5 and 6 to
examine the WSPs’s equilibrium profits.
Observation 1: A WSP’s equilibrium profit can decrease
with its market share.
As shown in Fig.5(a) and 5(b), if both WSPs choose
rollover immediately, it is manifest that each WSP’s profit
10
1
2
D(
λ
λ+ S
+
1
2
S
λ+ S
)− E(
λ
λ + S
+
1
4
S
λ+ S
)− Eη0
λ0
λ0 + S
−
1
2
E(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)
( Eη0 λ0S
1
2
(D − E) − E λ
S
) λ+S
λ−λ0
−
1
2
Eη0
λ20
S(λ0 + S)
( Eη0 λ0S
1
2
(D − E)− E λ
S
) λ0+S
λ−λ0 = 0.
(37)
ηs = max
(
1− η˜s,min
(
max(1− ηˆs,
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2 + 2(D − E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D − E)
),min(ηˆs, 1−
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2 + 2(D − E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D − E)
)
))
. (38)
Dηi(
λ
λ+ S
+ ηi
S
λ+ S
) − E(
λ
λ+ S
+ η2i
S
λ+ S
)− Eη0
λ0
λ0 + S
− ηjE(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)(
1
κsj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0 −
1
2
Eη0
λ20
S(λ0 + S)
(
1
κsj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 = 0. (39)
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Fig. 6: WSP’s equilibrium profit (the blue solid curve) under first rollover versus
η0 .
increases with its market share. However, in Fig. 5(b), we
observe that if WSP i provides rollover data plan first, its
profit for first rollover may decrease with its market share
ηi. This is because as ηi increases, WSP j’s market share
ηj decreases and it brings forward its rollover time, which
results in the number of new users and the existing users
switched fromWSP j becomes smaller. Similarly, in Fig. 5(c),
the WSP i’s profit suddenly reduces as ηi increases across
the threshold point 1− η¯r (i.e., from medium to large market
share). The reason is that if ηi is slightly larger than 1 − η¯r ,
WSP i prefers rollover late and the revenue received from
the few new users cannot compensate for the revenue loss
due to its many existing users’ cost reduction.
Observation 2: The WSP may not benefit from the new
user population.
As shown in Fig. 6, the WSP’s profit for earlier rollover
first increases with η0, as it gains more revenue from more
new users. However, as η0 further increases, the WSP’s
profit for earlier rollover decreases. This is because the other
WSP’s rollover time is brought forward (with intensified
competition), which reduces the number of new users and
switched existing users subscribed to the WSP of earlier
rollover.
4 TIMING EQUILIBRIUM FOR SHARED DATA PLAN
When deciding the timing for shared data plan, a WSP also
faces the tradeoff between its overage charge loss from its
existing users and the profit gain of market share (from
new users and those from the other WSP). Recall that in the
earlier upgrade profit in (22), we have introduced D and E
in (24) and (25) to tell the families’ expected costs before and
(a) Large η0 regime or D ≤ E
λ+S
S
case
(b) Medium η0 regime
(c) Small η0 regime (if exists)
Fig. 7: Equilibrium timing vs new user population η0 and WSP i’s market share.
after using the shared data plan, respectively. We note that
D > E as the (heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light) families’ costs
are reduced. One can imagine that if the cost reduction after
offering the shared data plan is huge, the WSPs prefer not
to offer due to large revenue loss. In the following analysis,
we consider an upper bound for such cost reduction, i.e.,
D < E 4λ+S
S
.4 Similar to the timing analysis of the rollover
data plan, we first analyze the WSPs’ best responses and
then derive the WSPs’ equilibrium timing of shared data
plan as follows.
Theorem 4.1. The WSPs’ equilibrium upgrade timing of
shared data plan is given as follows (see Fig. 7):
• If D ≤ E λ+S
S
, the overage charge reduction af-
ter offering shared data plan is mild and the two
WSPs will immediately upgrade their data plans (i.e.,
T nei = T
ne
j = 0), as shown in Fig. 7(a).
• If D > E λ+S
S
, the WSPs’ equilibrium share timing
depends on the new user proportion η0 and the
WSPs’ market shares:
1) Large η0 regime (η0 ≥
2(DS−E(λ+S))
Eλ0
): both
WSPs will offer shared data plan immedi-
ately to attract many new (heavy, heavy) and
(heavy, light) families (i.e., T nei = T
ne
j = 0),
as shown in Fig. 7(a).
2) Medium η0 regime
(min((η¯s0)
+, (DS−E(2λ+S)2Eλ0 )
+) < η0 <
4. For the case when D ≥ E 4λ+S
S
, we can show that the equilibrium
analysis is similar, and in the equilibrium results that only the medium
η0 regime includes more tedious cases to quantify equilibrium timing.
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Fig. 8: WSPs’ equilibrium profits at equilibrium share time versus WSP i’s market share (ηi or 1 − ηj ) and new user proportion η0.
2(DS−E(λ+S))
Eλ0
with η¯s0 as the solution to
(37)): the median size of new users and the
other WSP’s many users allure the WSP with
a small market share (less than ηs in (38)
5)
to upgrade immediately, and the other WSP
purposely waits for
log κsi
λ−λ0
, i ∈ {1, 2} > 0,
where
κsi =
(D − E)η2i − E
λ
S
ηi
1
2Eη0
λ0
S
.
If the two WSPs have similar market shares
(between ηs and 1 − ηs), they will upgrade
immediately to keep their existing users and
attract new users (see Fig. 7(b)).
3) Small η0 regime (0 ≤ η0 ≤
min((η¯s0)
+, (DS−E(2λ+S)2Eλ0 )
+)): the small
size of new users cannot allure the two
WSPs with similar market shares (between
ηˆs and 1 − ηˆs with ηˆs as the solution to
(39)) to upgrade to shared data plan (i.e.,
T nei = T
ne
j = ∞). Only the WSP of small
market share (less than ηˆs) still chooses to
upgrade to attract the other WSP’s large
market share, and the other will still upgrade
after
log κsi
λ−λ0
, i ∈ {1, 2} to keep its market share
to some extent (see Fig. 7(c)).
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is given in Appendix C of the
supplemental material. Unlike Theorem 3.1 for the rollover
data plan, here the small η0 regime in Fig. 7(c) does not exist
if DS−E(2λ+S)2Eλ0 ≤ 0. Then, we only have large and medium
η0 regimes in Fig. 7(a) and 7(b), where at least one WSP
will upgrade to shared data plan even for few new user
population. Recall when η0 = 0 in the rollover data case,
the WSPs can only benefit from the heavy users, and the
WSPs with similar market share will not offer rollover as
shown in Fig. 4(c). However, this is not true for the shared
data case as a WSP benefits from attracting (heavy,heavy)
and (heavy,light) families from the other WSP. Here, the rel-
ative proportion between (heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light)
5. η˜s in (38) is the solution of R
s,≤
i (Ti = 0, Tj =
logκsj
λ−λ0
) =
R
s,>
i (Tj = 0, Ti =
log κsi
λ−λ0
) as a function of ηi for any given η0, with
R
s,≤
i
and Rs,>
i
given in (22) and (23) respectively.
families increases with the proportion of heavy users α. In
the following proposition, we discuss this different result
clearly given no new user arrival.
Proposition 4.1. Even if η0 = 0, both WSPs with similar
market shares (between ηs and 1 − ηs in Fig. 7(b)) will
still offer the shared data plan, once one of the following
three conditions is true:
• Large (heavy, heavy) family proportion with mild cost
reduction: If (heavy, light) family’s cost reduction is
significant (i.e., ECh+ECl
ECh,l
> 2λ+S
S
) but (heavy, heavy)
family’s cost reduction is mild (i.e., 2ECh
ECh,h
≤ 2λ+S
S
),
then the WSPs will offer shared data plan when
facing large proportion of (heavy, heavy) families
(i.e., α ≥
2(ECh+ECl−
2λ+S
S
ECh,l)
2ECl+(ECh,h−2ECh,l)
2λ+S
S
).
• Large (heavy, light) family proportion with mild cost
reduction: If (heavy, light) family’s cost reduction is
mild (i.e., ECh+ECl
ECh,l
≤ 2λ+S
S
) but (heavy, heavy) fam-
ily’s cost reduction is significant (i.e., 2ECh
ECh,h
> 2λ+S
S
),
then the WSPs will offer shared data plan when
facing small proportion of (heavy, heavy) families
(i.e., α ≤
2(ECh+ECl−
2λ+S
S
ECh,l)
2ECl+(ECh,h−2ECh,l)
2λ+S
S
).
• Mild cost reduction for both (heavy, heavy) and (heavy,
light) families: If both (heavy, heavy) and (heavy, light)
families’ cost reductions are mild (i.e., ECh+ECl
ECh,l
≤
2λ+S
S
and 2ECh
ECh,h
≤ 2λ+S
S
), then the WSPs will offer
shared data plan for any α ∈ (0, 1).
The Proof of Proposition 4.1 is given in Appendix D of
the supplemental material.
4.1 WSPs’ Profits at Equilibrium Timing
By substituting the equilibrium timing in Theorem 4.1 to
(22) and (23), we can derive the equilibrium profits of the
two WSPs. At the equilibrium share time, the profit of WSP
i, i = 1, 2 is given as follows:
• The WSP i’s profit for offering shared data plan at
the same time, i.e., T nei = T
ne
j = 0, is
R¯si = ηiNE
1
S
+ηiηjN(D−E)
1
λ + S
+
1
2
N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
).
(40)
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• The WSP i’s profit for offering shared data plan first,
i.e., T nei = 0 is
R¯s,≤i =EN(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
) + η2iN
1
λ+ S
E
+ ηiηjND
1
λ+ S
+N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
)
− (1− ηi)NE(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
)(
1
κsj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
−
1
2
N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
)(
1
κsj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 .
(41)
• The WSP i’s profit for offering shared data plan late,
i.e., T nei =
log κsi
λ−λ0
, is
R¯s,>i =ηiND
1
λ+ S
(1− (
1
κsi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0 )
+ ηiNE
1
S
(
1
κsi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+ ηiηjN(D − E)
1
λ+ S
(
1
κsi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+
1
2
N0E(
1
S
−
1
λ0 + S
)(
1
κsi
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 .
(42)
Fig. 8 numerically shows how the WSPs’ equilibrium
profits change with their market shares in the three η0
regimes. As shown in Fig. 8(a) and 8(b), if both WSPs choose
shared data immediately, each WSP’s profit increases with
its market share. However, as shown in Fig. 8(b), a WSP’s
profit for earlier share may decrease with its market share.
This is because WSP j brings forward its upgrade time due
to the reduced market share ηj , and thus less new users and
WSP j’s users subscribe to WSP i. Similarly, in Fig. 8(c), the
WSP i’s profit suddenly reduces as ηi increases across the
threshold point 1 − ηˆs (i.e., from medium to large market
share). The reason is that WSP i with large market share
faces large revenue loss of overage charge, which cannot be
made up by the revenue gain from the few new users.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper analytically studies the competitive WSPs’ tim-
ing of offering innovative data plans. For the WSP with
small market share, it is better to upgrade first to attract
more users (especially from the other WSP). While for the
WSP with large market share, it is better to upgrade late to
avoid immediate loss in overage charge. For the WSPs with
similar market shares, they should upgrade immediately for
large new user population and may not upgrade for small
new user population. The launching of different innovative
data plans also depends on their strategies. According to the
composition of users in a family, the WSPs may upgrade to
shared data plan simultaneously even when no new user
arrives, which is different from the rollover data plan.
In the future, we plan to extend our results in two possi-
ble directions. First, we could consider a variety of separate
rollover and shared data plans (e.g., for 2G/3G/4G) to fit
heterogeneous users. Though the analysis is more involved
by modeling mixed user churn flows from any existing plan
to any innovative plan under the same or different WSPs,
we still expect the WSP of small market share chooses
innovative data plan first. Second, we can extend users’
static data usage model and consider that the innovative
data plans may motivate users to increase their usage. In
this case, the WSPs’ overage charges reduce less severely
and they havemore incentives to announce innovative plans
earlier.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
According to Proposition 3.1, we can see that the possible
equilibrium rollover time for theWSPs are (T nei = T
ne
j = 0),
(T nei = T
ne
j > 0), (T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
), (T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κi
λ−λ0
), (T nei = T
ne
j = ∞). In the following, we will discuss
the conditions for each equilibrium.
(T nei = T
ne
j = 0) is the equilibrium if and only if
∂Rr,>i (Ti, 0)
∂Ti
=2αNi(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+ S
S
)eλTj−(λ+S)Ti
− αN0EC
r
h
λ0
S
eλ0Tj−(λ0+S)Ti ≤ 0,
(43)
and
∂Rr,>j (0, Tj)
∂Tj
=2αNj(ECh − EC
r
h
λ+ S
S
)eλTi−(λ+S)Tj
− αN0EC
r
h
λ0
S
eλ0Ti−(λ0+S)Tj ≤ 0,
(44)
i.e., κi ≤ 1 and κj ≤ 1.
It is manifest that when ECh ≤ EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, which means
the heavy user’s expected cost after rollover is close to that
before rollover, both WSPs will rollover at the beginning.
Then, we show that if T nei = T
ne
j is the equilibrium, we
have T nei = T
ne
j = 0.
If T nei = T
ne
j is the equilibrium, if and only if κi ≤ 1,
κj ≤ 1 and
∂Rr,≤i
∂Ti
|Ti=Tj ≥ 0, (45)
and
∂Rr,≤j
∂Tj
|Tj=Ti ≥ 0, (46)
i.e.,
2α(NiECh −NEC
r
h +Nj
S
λ+ S
ECrh)− 2αN0
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh
− 2αNj(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrh + αN0(
λ0
λ0 + S
−
λ0
S
)ECrh ≥ 0,
(47)
and
2α(NjECh −NEC
r
h +Ni
S
λ+ S
ECrh)− 2αN0
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh
− 2αNi(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrh + αN0(
λ0
λ0 + S
−
λ0
S
)ECrh ≥ 0,
(48)
According to κi ≤ 1 and κj ≤ 1, the proportion of new
users should satisfy S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
) ≤ η0 <
2S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
).
Under this circumstance, by solving (47) and (48), we have
ηi > 0.5 and ηj = 1 − ηi > 0.5, which can’t be satisfied
simultaneously. Therefore, T nei = T
ne
j = 0.
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The necessary condition for (T nei = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
) is
κj > 1 and
∂R
r,≤
i
∂Ti
|
Tj=
log κj
λ−λ0
< 0, i.e., g(ηi) < 0, where
g(ηi) =2α(NiECh −NEC
r
h +Nj
S
λ+ S
ECrh)
− 2αNj(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrh(
1
κj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
− αN0(
λ0
S
−
λ0
λ0 + S
)ECrh(
1
κj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0
− 2αN0
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh.
(49)
And the necessary condition for (T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κi
λ−λ0
) is
κi > 1 and
∂R
r,e
j
∂Tj
|
Ti=
log κi
λ−λ0
< 0, i.e.,
2α(NjECh −NEC
r
h +Ni
S
λ+ S
ECrh)− 2αN0
λ0
λ0 + S
ECrh
− 2αNi(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)ECrh(
1
κi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+ αN0(
λ0
λ0 + S
−
λ0
S
)ECrh(
1
κi
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 < 0.
(50)
Otherwise, both WSPs will not rollover, i.e., (T nei =
T nej =∞).
When ECh > EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, according to κi ≤ 1 and κj ≤
1, T nei = T
ne
j = 0 is the equilibrium if and only if 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
≤ ηi ≤
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
. Therefore, when
η0 ≥
2S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
), we have
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
≥ 1, which
means the condition always holds and T nei = T
ne
j = 0 is
the equilibrium.
Since g(ηi = 0) < 0 and g(ηi) decreases with η0,
the solution of g(ηi = 0) = 0, denoted as η¯r , increases
with η0. Therefore, if g(ηi = 0.5) < 0 for a given ηˆ0,
then, for any η0 > ηˆ0, g(ηi = 0.5) < 0, which means
η¯r > 0.5. When η0 =
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
) and ηi = 0.5, we
have κj = 1. Since ECh > EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, it is easy to check
that g(ηi = 0.5) < 0. Therefore, when
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
) <
η0 <
2S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
), i.e., 0.5 <
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
< 1,
η¯r > 0.5 > 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
. Then, when 0 ≤ ηi <
1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
, g(ηi) ≤ 0 is always satisfied and
thus T nei = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
is the equilibrium. Similarly,
for the case when
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
< ηi ≤ 1, we have
T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κi
λ−λ0
is the equilibrium. Note that when
0.5 <
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
< 1, 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
<
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
. Thus, when 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
≤ ηi ≤
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
, T nei = T
ne
j = 0.
Define φ(η0) := g(ηi = 0.5) and denote its solution as η¯0.
Since ECh > EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, it is easy to check that φ(η0 = 0) > 0,
and thus η¯0 > 0. Then, when η0 ≤ η¯0, we have η¯r ≤ 0.5
and when η0 > η¯0, we have η¯r > 0.5. We can check that
φ(η0 =
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)) < 0 when ECh > EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, which
results in η¯0 <
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
). When η¯0 < η0 ≤
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
−
λ+S
S
),
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
≤ 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
. Thus,
when max(1 − η¯r,
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
) < ηi < min(η¯r, 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
), all the conditions κi > 1, κj > 1,
∂R
r,≤
j
∂Tj
|
Ti=
log κi
λ−λ0
< 0 and
∂R
r,≤
i
∂Ti
|
Tj=
log κj
λ−λ0
< 0 are satisfied
and the WSPs choose to rollover early or late by com-
paring their profits. For any η0 ∈ (η¯0,
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)),
denote η˜r as the solution of R¯
r,≤
i (ηi) − R¯
r,>
i (ηi) = 0.
Then, when WSP i’s market share is large (ηi > η˜r), it
chooses to rollover late (R¯r,≤i (ηi) < R¯
r,>
i (ηi)); when WSP
i’s market share is small (ηi < η˜r), it chooses to rollover
early (R¯r,≤i (ηi) > R¯
r,>
i (ηi)). Therefore, when ηi < η˜r and
ηj > η˜r , i.e., ηi < min(η˜r , 1 − η˜r), T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
is the equilibrium and when ηj < η˜r and ηi > η˜r , i.e.,
ηi > max(η˜r, 1 − η˜r), T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
is the equi-
librium. If η˜r ≥ 0.5, the conditions ηi < η˜r, ηj < η˜r are
satisfied when 1− η˜r < ηi < η˜r , then, both WSPs choose to
rollover early (T nei = T
ne
j = 0); If η˜r < 0.5, the conditions
ηi > η˜r, ηj > η˜r are satisfied when η˜r < ηi < 1 − η˜r ,
then, both WSPs choose to rollover late (T nei = T
ne
j = ∞).
According to WSP i’s profits for first and late rollover, i.e.,
R¯r,≤i =2αNEC
r
h
1
S
− 2αNjEC
r
h
1
S + λ
− 2αNjEC
r
h(
1
S
−
1
λ+ S
)(
1
κj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+ 2αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)ECrh
− αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)(
1
κj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 ECrh,
(51)
and
R¯r,>i =2αNi
1
λ+ S
ECh(1 − (
1
κi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0 )
+ 2αNi
1
S
ECrh(
1
κi
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
+ αN0(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)(
1
κi
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 ECrh,
(52)
when η0 ∈ (η¯0,
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)), R¯r,≤i (ηi) − R¯
r,>
i (ηi) de-
creases with ηi. Define ψ(η0) := R¯
r,≤
i (ηi = 0.5)− R¯
r,>
i (ηi =
0.5). When ECh < EC
r
h
2λ+S
S
, we can check that ψ(η0) ≥ 0
always holds for η0 ∈ (0,
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)), which means
η˜r ≥ 0.5 for η0 ∈ (η¯0,
S
λ0
(ECh
ECr
h
− λ+S
S
)).
Note that T nei = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
is the equilibrium if ηi <
min(η¯r , 1 −
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
) and T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κi
λ−λ0
is
the equilibrium if ηi > max(1 − η¯r,
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
). For
η0 ≤ η¯0, as η¯r ≤ 0.5 and
N0EC
r
h
λ0
S
2N(ECh−ECrh
λ+S
S
)
< 0.5, then,
we have T nei = 0, T
ne
j =
log κj
λ−λ0
when 0 ≤ ηi ≤ η¯r and
T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κi
λ−λ0
when 1 − η¯r ≤ ηi ≤ 1. When η¯r <
ηi < 1 − η¯r , all the equilibrium conditions can’t be satisfied
and thus T nei = T
ne
j =∞.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
When ECh ≤ EC
r
h
λ+S
S
, the WSPs rollover at the same time.
If R¯ri (ηi = 1) ≥ Ri(ηi = 1), which means the cost reduction
ECh − EC
r
h is very small and the number of new users
N0 is large, the WSPs always gain profit by rollover data.
Otherwise, there exists an unique threshold ηthi such that
when ηi ≤ η
th
i , WSP i gains profit and when ηi > η
th
i , WSP
i losses profit by rollover data.
In the following, we discuss the situation when ECh >
ECrh
λ+S
S
. When ηi = 0, the WSP’s profit before rollover is
0, which is smaller than its profit after rollover.
As R¯ri increases with η0, we have
R¯ri (ηi = 1) ≤2αNEC
r
h
1
S
+ αN(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)ECrh
<2αNECrh
λ+ S
S
1
S
≤ 2αNECh
1
S
=Ri(ηi = 1).
(53)
Thus, when ηi = 1, the WSP’s profit for rollover at the same
time is smaller than its profit before rollover.
By noting that the WSP’s profit linearly increases with
ηi, there is only one intersection of R¯
r
i (ηi) and Ri(ηi) for
large η0.
For any ηi, by comparing R¯
r
i and R¯
r,≤
i , it is obvious that
R¯ri < R¯
r,≤
i .
Note that
R¯r,>i (ηi = 1) <2αN
1
λ+ S
ECh + αN(
1
S
−
1
S + λ0
)ECrh
<2αNECh
1
S
= Ri(ηi = 1).
(54)
For medium η0, if the WSP i chooses to rollover late, then
ηi > 0.5. Therefore, we have R¯
r,>
i (ηi) < Ri due to η0 < 1
and ECh > EC
r
h
λ+S
S
.
Note that Ri(ηi) increases faster than R¯
r
i (ηi). Therefore,
there is an unique intersection of the WSP’s profits before
and after rollover for medium η0.
For small η0, when η¯r < ηi < 1 − η¯r , the WSPs choose
not to rollover data. Thus, the unique intersection of the
WSP’s profits before and after rollover is the ηthi such that
Ri(ηi) = R¯
r,≤
i (ηi).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Fig. 9: Two WSPs’ best responses to each other and the equilibrium rollover time.
Note that if a WSP offers shared data plan first and
the other offers later, the equilibrium will converge to
(T nei = 0, T
ne
j > 0) or (T
ne
i = T
ne
j = ∞) as shown in
Fig. 9. Therefore, the possible equilibrium share time for
the WSPs are (T nei = T
ne
j = 0), (T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κsj
λ−λ0
),
(T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κsi
λ−λ0
), and (T nei = T
ne
j = ∞), where
T nei =
log κsi
λ−λ0
is obtained by letting
∂R
s,>
i
∂Ti
|Tj=0 = 0.
(T nei = T
ne
j = 0) is the equilibrium if and only if
∂R
s,>
i
(Ti,0)
∂Ti
≤ 0 and
∂R
s,>
j
(Tj ,0)
∂Tj
≤ 0, i.e., both ηi, ηj satisfies
ηi, ηj ≤
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2 + 2(D − E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D − E)
. (55)
Note the if D ≤ E λ+S
S
or η0 ≥
2(DS−E(λ+S))
Eλ0
, (55) is
always satisfied due to
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ≥ 1.
In the following, we discuss the situation when D >
E λ+S
S
and η0 <
2(DS−E(λ+S))
Eλ0
.
(T nei = 0, T
ne
j =
log κsj
λ−λ0
) is the equilibrium if κsj > 1 and
∂R
s,≤
i
∂Ti
|
Tj=
log κs
j
λ−λ0
< 0, i.e.,
v(ηi) =Dηi(
λ
λ+ S
+ ηi
S
λ+ S
)− E(
λ
λ+ S
+ η2i
S
λ+ S
)
− Eη0
λ0
λ0 + S
− ηjE(
λ
S
−
λ
λ+ S
)(
1
κsj
)
λ+S
λ−λ0
−
1
2
Eη0
λ20
S(λ0 + S)
(
1
κsj
)
λ0+S
λ−λ0 < 0.
(56)
Denote ηˆs as the solution to v(ηi) = 0 and η¯
s
0 as the
solution to χ(η0) := v(ηi = 0.5) = 0. Note that v(ηi = 0) <
0 and v(ηi) decreases with η0, thus ηˆs increases with η0.
Then, when η0 ≤ η¯
s
0, ηˆs ≤ 0.5 and when η0 > η¯
s
0, ηˆs > 0.5.
Therefore, if 0 ≤ η0 ≤ min((η¯
s
0)
+, (DS−E(2λ+S)2Eλ0 )
+), then,
when 0 ≤ ηi ≤ ηˆs, T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κsj
λ−λ0
; When ηˆs <
ηi < 1 − ηˆs, T
ne
i = T
ne
j = ∞; When 1 − ηˆs ≤ ηi ≤ 1,
T nej = 0, T
ne
i =
log κsi
λ−λ0
.
Then, we consider the case when
min((η¯s0)
+, (DS−E(2λ+S)2Eλ0 )
+) < η0 <
2(DS−E(λ+S))
Eλ0
.
If min(ηˆs, 1 −
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ) ≤ max(1 −
ηˆs,
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ), according to the above
analysis, we can conclude that when 0 ≤ ηi < min(ηˆs, 1 −
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ), T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κsj
λ−λ0
; when
min(ηˆs, 1 −
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ) ≤ ηi ≤ max(1 −
ηˆs,
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ), T
ne
i = T
ne
j = 0; when
max(1 − ηˆs,
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ) < ηi ≤ 1, T
ne
j =
0, T nei =
log κsi
λ−λ0
. If min(ηˆs, 1 −
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ) >
max(1− ηˆs,
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2+2(D−E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D−E) ), all the conditions
ηi, ηj >
E λ
S
+
√
(E λ
S
)2 + 2(D − E)Eη0
λ0
S
2(D − E)
, (57)
∂R
s,≤
j
∂Tj
|
Ti=
log κs
i
λ−λ0
< 0 and
∂R
s,≤
i
∂Ti
|
Tj=
log κs
j
λ−λ0
< 0 are satisfied
and the WSPs choose to offer shared data plan early or
late by comparing their profits. Denote η˜s as the solution
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of R¯s,≤i (ηi)− R¯
s,>
i (ηi) = 0. WSP i choose shared data plan
earlier if ηi ≤ η˜s and later if ηi > η˜s. Since D ≥ E
4λ+S
S
, we
have η˜s ≥ 0.5. Thus, when ηi < 1−η˜s, WSP i prefers to offer
shared data plan first while WSP j prefers later, and when
ηi > η˜s, WSP j prefers earlier while WSP i prefers later.
When 1 − η˜s ≤ ηi ≤ η˜s, both WSPs prefer to offer shared
data plan earlier and thus T nei = T
ne
j = 0. Therefore, for the
case min((η¯s0)
+, (DS−E(2λ+S)2Eλ0 )
+) < η0 <
2(DS−E(λ+S))
Eλ0
, we
can conclude that when 0 ≤ ηi < ηs, T
ne
i = 0, T
ne
j =
log κsj
λ−λ0
;
when ηs ≤ ηi ≤ 1 − ηs, T
ne
i = T
ne
j = 0; when
1− ηs < ηi ≤ 1, T
ne
j = 0, T
ne
i =
log κsi
λ−λ0
.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1
We only need to check the conditions whenDS ≤ E(2λ+S),
i.e.,
2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l
≤α(2SECl + (2λ+ S)ECh,h − 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l).
(58)
If ECh+ECl
ECh,l
> 2λ+S
S
and 2ECh
ECh,h
≤ 2λ+S
S
, we have
2SECl + (2λ+ S)ECh,h − 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l
≥2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l > 0.
Thus, if α ≥
2(ECh+ECl−
2λ+S
S
ECh,l)
2ECl+(ECh,h−2ECh,l)
2λ+S
S
, (58) is satisfied.
If ECh+ECl
ECh,l
≤ 2λ+S
S
and 2ECh
ECh,h
> 2λ+S
S
, we have
2SECl + (2λ+ S)ECh,h − 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l
<2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l ≤ 0.
Thus, if α ≤
2(ECh+ECl−
2λ+S
S
ECh,l)
2ECl+(ECh,h−2ECh,l)
2λ+S
S
, (58) is satisfied.
If ECh+ECl
ECh,l
≤ 2λ+S
S
and 2ECh
ECh,h
≤ 2λ+S
S
, we have
2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l ≤ 0 and
2SECl + (2λ+ S)ECh,h − 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l
≥2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l.
Since α ∈ (0, 1), (58) always holds.
If ECh+ECl
ECh,l
> 2λ+S
S
and 2ECh
ECh,h
> 2λ+S
S
, we have we have
2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l > 0 and
2SECl + (2λ+ S)ECh,h − 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l
<2S(ECh + ECl)− 2(2λ+ S)ECh,l.
By noting that α ∈ (0, 1), (58) never holds.
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